In May, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to exempt an employee challenging her former employer’s pay decisions as discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from the Act’s 180-day time limit for filing a charge of discrimination (subject to an extension of up to 300 days in deferral states) with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (or an equivalent state agency). See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, No. 05-1074. The EEOC and most courts of appeals had interpreted the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Bazemore v. Friday as adopting a “paycheck accrual method,” meaning that each paycheck triggered a new time limit for when a charge could be brought, even if the paycheck was merely the result of a discriminatory act that occurred long ago. In Ledbetter, however, the Court held that the time for filing such a charge ran from the date “the alleged employment practice occurred,” which, in Ledbetter’s case, was more than six years prior to the filing of her charge. In so holding, the Court clarified that the rule announced in Bazemore meant that an employer violates Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment – and, thus, triggers a new EEOC charging period – only when the employer issues a paycheck under an existing discriminatory pay structure (i.e., a structure adopted with discriminatory intent) or is otherwise motivated by a discrete discriminatory act that is the subject of a timely EEOC charge.

The holding in Ledbetter implicitly recognized the two historical reasons for statutes of limitations: to encourage potential plaintiffs to file claims while reliable evidence is still available at trial; and to protect potential defendants from uncertainty regarding potential litigation and stale claims. (The Court, for example, observed that the alleged discriminatory decision-maker in Ledbetter had died before the case could be tried.) The Court further noted that the relatively short filing deadlines specifically provided for under the Act reflected Congress’ strong preference for the prompt processing of allegations of discrimination as well as their potential resolution through voluntary conciliation and cooperation. Respecting the legislative judgment inherent in the statutory scheme, the Court refused to extend the deadlines established in the Act.

Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, urged Congress to legislatively overrule the majority’s holding by amending the Act to recognize the paycheck accrual rule, and several members have indicated their desire to do so. In the meantime, the Court has indicated its intent to address further the conditions precedent of the federal anti-discrimination laws, as well as several other employment-related issues under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Second Circuit had erred in finding that an intake questionnaire and an accompanying verified affidavit filed with the EEOC – but which the Commission never investigated or gave notice of to the employer – constituted a valid charge of discrimination under the ADEA. The Court also will review the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn that the trial court erred in refusing to permit an ADEA plaintiff to offer testimony from other employees who were included in the workforce reduction at issue, even though those other employees did not report to the same decision-maker.

Finally, there is a petition for certiorari pending before the Court seeking review of the Second Circuit’s holding in a disparate impact case brought under the ADEA. The plaintiffs have sought review of the trial court’s holding that they bore the burden of persuasion in showing that the employer did not rely upon “reasonable factors other than age.” The plaintiffs also have petitioned the Court to decide the related issue of whether the employer’s decision to permit individual managers to select the employees to be included in the workforce reduction constituted a RFOA.